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Assimilation, Acculturation, and the Law: Solving a  
“Problem” Like Shar’ia 
 
Kristina Benson 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Department of Islamic Studies and School of Law 
 
Abstract 
 
An unexpected development in the English legal system involves Muslim women’s use of legally 
binding Shar’ia councils to protect their autonomy, marital security, and property rights. 
Although scholars and political commentators alike have voiced concerns that Muslim women 
will be treated unfairly in these councils, there is some indication that women have become adept 
at navigating this plural legal landscape and that they have often managed to secure better 
outcomes from Shar’ia family law than from English courts. Over 80 Shar’ia tribunals have been 
established to issue legally binding decisions on divorce, child custody, inheritance, and other 
areas of family law. My paper investigates the ways in which Muslim women living in England 
navigate secular and religious systems of law, and will compare decisions made by English 
family courts to those made in Shar’ia councils. In so doing, I will suggest that Shar’ia law may 
be proliferating in England in part because it affords divorced Muslim women better outcomes 
than English family law. 
 
 
  
Legally Binding Shar’ia Law in the British Isles:  
A Short History and Introduction 
 
At present, Muslims are a significant religious minority in Great Britain, numbering over 
1,500,000 people, and are primarily of South Asian, East African, or Middle Eastern origin 
(Peach 2006, 637-638). British sociologists and political scientists, influenced primarily by the 
models developed by the Chicago School of sociology, have generally assumed that Muslims’ 
interest in Shar’ia law would discontinue as they became more acculturated to life in Great 
Britain. This has not, however, been the case: A 2007 Telegraph poll, for example, showed that 
nearly 40% of Muslims in the U.K. held Shar’ia law in higher esteem than state law (Meehan 
2007), and there is evidence that Muslim couples in England frequently decline to register their 
marriage with the state, marrying only in the mosque (Yilmaz 2005, 73-76). 
  The Shar’ia councils, which grew out of informal neighborhood tribunals, have therefore 
become a permanent part of many Muslim religio-ethnic enclaves. This development, of course, 
has been a topic of heated controversy, particularly after the councils’ decisions became legally 
binding in 2008 due to a new application of the 1996 Arbitration Act. These councils represent 
different schools of Islamic thought in order to serve the various Muslim communities in Britain 
and act as mediators to those wishing to preserve Islamic principles, however defined. The role 
of the British Shar’ia councils is typically limited to overseeing matters that pertain to family 
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law, and the councils mediate divorces, separations, and reconciliations. They also produce 
fatawa, or non-binding opinions issued by religious scholars, on Muslims’ crises, questions, or 
concerns. The council summarizes the need for their existence, as well as the services they offer, 
as follows: 
 
Historically, Muslim organisations have urged the legislative authorities in the 
UK to factor the Islamic viewpoint into all aspects of the legislative process, not 
least in the field of family law: the response to this call has been surprising 
indeed. The answer has been clear and unequivocal: one country - one law. Given 
that what was traditionally known as, 'the Christian perspective' in the UK has 
been essentially annexed from all legal and legislative processes, it almost seems 
inappropriate to expect that the perspective of yet another religion - Islam - be 
factored into the discussion…The [Shar’ia] Council is also widely accepted by 
the UK Muslim community and this is shown by the sheer volume of enquiries 
related to marital problems which it receives from the general UK public: 
additionally, a significant number of solicitors who were able only to secure civil 
divorces for their clients have found recourse with the Council regarding also 
securing Islamic divorces for their respective clients. (Islamic Shar’ia Councils 
2011, “About Us”) 
 
The issues raised by the above passage will be explored in the following section, particularly the 
degree to which English law is, indeed, informed by Christian presumptions of what is 
normative, and the nature of the “sheer volume of enquiries related to marital problems.”  
First, however, it should be clarified that these councils have no power to issue a civil 
divorce: divorce is a matter of personal status under state law, and as such, there is a difference 
between one’s “status” under state law, and the resolution of disputes between individuals. More 
specifically, in the event that individuals are unable to settle a dispute on their own, and are 
disinclined to begin legal proceedings, they can choose to have their disputes resolved by an 
arbitrator, which is sort of like a private judge. Unless there is some sort of irregularity, 
procedural or otherwise, the decision of the arbitrator will be enforced in the same way as a court 
ruling.  
It thus follows that parties might decide to select an arbitrator that is able to settle their 
dispute under the aegis of Shar’ia law. As of 2008, this is permitted in England, and the results 
enforceable in a court of law, provided (as noted above) that there are no procedural irregularities 
and all parties agree that its procedures are fair. The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) 
“offer[s] the Muslim community a real and true opportunity to settle disputes in accordance with 
Islamic Sacred Law with the knowledge that the outcome as determined by MAT will be binding 
and enforceable” (Muslims Arbitration Tribunal 2012, “Legals”). Disputes settled according to 
Shar’ia are therefore still operating “within the legal framework of England and Wales” 
(Rozenberg 2008). When sitting, the MAT has on its panel a scholar of Islamic sacred law and a 
solicitor or barrister registered to practice in England and Wales (Rozenberg 2008). Given that 
the panel is not authorized to change a person’s status under civil law, as aforementioned, the 
couple must still seek a decree absolute certificate from the state in the event that the panel issues 
a divorce under the Shar’ia. In order for the divorce to remain legally binding, the High Court, 
generally speaking, must agree to uphold the decision of Shar’ia tribunal (Rozenberg 2008). 
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In the event that a Muslim couple is divorcing in the civil sense and one of the parties 
refuses for whatever reason to initiate a divorce under the Sha’ria, the other party can seek the 
help of Shar’ia councils in filing a decree nisi, meaning that the civil court can choose to make a 
religious divorce a condition for finalizing the civil divorce (Proudman 2012). A discussion of 
these concepts in application will occur in a following section, however for now, suffice it to say 
that the Shar’ia councils are like any other kind of venue for arbitration in that they must 
conform to the overall framework of state law, and assuming they do so, their decisions will be 
accepted as the basis of an English court decision and legally enforceable. 
In order to get a sense of the motivations behind Muslims’ bicultural, bi-legal navigation, 
and in order to understand the Islamic Shar’ia Council’s above claim that the Christian 
perspective has been “essentially annexed from all legal and legislative processes,” we must first 
explore the role of marriage in Islam, and compare it to the role of marriage as articulated by 
family law in England and Wales. The following section will discuss Muslim marriage practices 
and English and Welsh family law before moving on to explore the potential tensions between 
the two. In so doing, I will show how British Muslim women living in England and Wales are 
motivated to use the Shar’ia councils not necessarily out of a resistance to assimilate culturally, 
but due to well-founded concerns about English and Welsh family law, its treatment of divorced 
women in general, and of divorced Muslim women in particular. 
 
Marriage And Islam And Marriage In England And Wales: Differences And Similarities 
 
 A detailed assessment of Muslim marriage and divorce within the context of Islamic 
jurisprudence would be outside of the scope of this paper; what will follow is a summary of its 
most salient features, leading into a discussion of relevant aspects of English and Welsh family 
law. A comparison of these legal frameworks will demonstrate that the formal system has not 
always succeeded in protecting the rights of Muslim women, motivating them to continue using 
the Shar’ia councils in place of the English courts.  
 It should first be noted that although the popular press often refers to “Shar’ia law” as 
though it is a monolithic and unchanging legal system, it is in fact much like any system of 
common law in that it has changed significantly throughout space and time. It is subject to local 
and temporal variation and always has been. In other words, Shar’ia law may be interpreted in 
Saudi Arabia in a manner that differs considerably from the way it is interpreted in Pakistan or 
Iran, and the contemporary interpretations in all of these countries and for all these peoples 
differs significantly from past interpretations in the same physical locations. This variety and 
variation is a reflection of Islamic law, rather than a deviation from it. Therefore, what follows 
will be a series of generalizations about the way Islamic law has developed in England, forming 
a hybrid system of law that the legal anthropologist Werner Menski (2006) refers to as “shariat 
angrezi or “English Shar’ia.” 
Generally speaking, Islamic jurisprudence in England and elsewhere does not so much 
grant rights to women as it does to wives, ex-wives, daughters, and mothers (Tucker 2000). A 
woman’s position in her extended kinship network is therefore of critical importance to her 
ability to control and manage her own property, to retain guardianship of her children, and to 
supervise her own affairs. In this framework, even though rights and obligations are certainly 
gendered, women have mechanisms available to them to protect their property and safeguard 
their autonomy. For example, women are independently able to enter into marriage, are entitled 
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to retain whatever assets they brought into the marriage, and can receive a stipend from their 
husbands for breastfeeding, housekeeping, and performing other domestic work.  
The Islamic concept of marriage also differs from the Christian one in that Christian 
marriage is either a sacrament (Catholic) or a covenant (Protestant)—that is, it is a rite or a ritual 
invested with sacred significance, marking the beginning of a relationship that is (ideally) to last 
in perpetuity and that triggers divinely mandated rights and obligations. Furthermore, whereas 
the traditional Christian view of divorce is that it is undesirable at best and a sin at worst, 
classical Islamic jurisprudence permits the Muslim marriage contract to be terminated by the 
husband at any time, and for any reason. Classical Islamic jurisprudence, in fact, regards 
marriage as no more or less significant than a contract legitimating sexual relations between 
certain people for a certain period of time and under certain conditions. As Islamic law expert 
Azizah al Hibri (2000) puts it, “If a woman gets divorced it's not a big deal. Now it's a big deal, 
but historically, ‘It's only a husband.’ She goes back to her family, brothers, father, and sisters. 
That's her family. Husbands come and go. In our families the real basic relationship is the blood 
relationship. You can divorce a husband; you cannot divorce a brother or a father” (in Q&A). 
The normative conception of marriage has, of course, changed in the post-colonial condition as 
well as for Muslims in diaspora, but contemporary Islamic law as it has developed in the U.K. 
and elsewhere is still informed by the premise that divorce is not a “sin,” nor is it a blight on the 
family or community. 
 When a Muslim woman gets married, she is entitled to a gift called a mahr under Shar’ia 
law. This is often translated to mean “dowry,” but this is an inaccurate translation as the wife 
does not give the mahr to the husband; rather, the husband gives it to the wife. Therefore, I will 
use the term “marriage portion.” The marriage portion is a sum upon which the husband and wife 
must agree before getting married, and their families on their behalf usually negotiate it. If the 
bride is so inclined, she can appoint a member of her family to negotiate it on her behalf. This 
sum can be paid in cash, stocks, bonds, property, or livestock; alternatively, it can be a symbolic 
token of appreciation or sentiment, such as a family Qur’an, an heirloom, or the engagement ring 
itself. In short, it can be anything, so long as the two agree on it. The initial marriage portion is 
given to the wife before the marriage. It cannot be used to pay off the husbands’ debts, to pay for 
the children’s care or education, to buy a house, or to subsidize the cost of the wedding. It is the 
wife’s sole and separate property and remains as such in perpetuity, even if the husband divorces 
her, abandons her, or dies.  
The amount of the marriage portion is recorded in the marriage contract. The marriage 
contract also can function as a safeguard of the woman’s dignity, independence, and autonomy, 
setting forth the terms and conditions for the marriage. The contract can forbid the husband from 
taking on a second wife, for example, stipulate that the wife remain employed while married, 
provide that she finish her education before having children, or even set limits on the amount of 
nights per week that the husband can go out.1  
There is, for all practical purposes, only one way to obtain a divorce in English and 
Welsh family courts: the couple simply files for divorce, and, generally speaking, it doesn’t 
                                                
1 See, for example, Nelly Hanna’s (1998) Making Big Money in 1600: the Life and Times of Isma’il Abu Taqiyya, 
Egyptian Merchant, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Hanna has found 17th-century marriage contracts that limit 
the amount of wives a husband can take, specify the quality of lodging that he must provide for his wife, limit the 
number of nights per week he can make social calls, and set a stipend that he must pay to his wife if she is 
breastfeeding, or is expected to perform household tasks.   
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matter which spouse filed first. Within the context of Muslim marriage practices, on the other 
hand, there are (broadly speaking) two ways to initiate divorce, and these are distinguished by 
whether it is the wife or the husband who initiates the proceedings. Talaq is unilateral 
repudiation on the part of the husband, and khul, or khul’a, describes a situation wherein the wife 
initiates divorce. Talaq can be broken down further into ahsan talaq and hasan talaq. A husband 
is said to have issued an ahsan talaq if his wife is between two menstrual periods, and the couple 
has not had sexual intercourse during this time. After the wife is initially talaq‘d, she must wait 
three menstrual cycles before the divorce is finalized, assuming that her husband does not revoke 
his request; the purpose here is to make sure that she is not pregnant when the final talaq is 
issued (Thompson and Yunus 2007, 364-367). Hasan talaq takes place during three consecutive 
periods when the wife is not menstruating, and the husband has the option of revoking his 
request until he pronounces it the last time; once again, the purpose being to determine whether 
or not the wife is pregnant (Thompson and Yunus 2007, 364-367). The “triple talaq” is when the 
husband simply announces to the woman that he divorces her three times; it is considered to be 
in bad taste, but is supported by Shar’ia law just the same. This method, it should be noted, is not 
upheld in British courts.  
If the husband initiates a talaq, whatever type of talaq it is, he must pay his wife the 
deferred marriage portion, which, as stated earlier, is recorded in the marriage contract and upon 
which both husband and wife must agree before marrying. This is an entirely separate sum from 
the initial marriage portion, which the wife is still entitled to keep regardless of who initiated the 
divorce. The husband is also required to pay his wife the marriage portion if he abandons her, 
and it must also be paid to her upon his death. The criterion for establishing a husband’s 
abandonment differs, however, in the various schools of Islamic Law and is further subject to 
local variation.  
If the wife wants to initiate a divorce, she can initiate khul. However, if she fails to 
demonstrate that the husband violated the terms of the marriage contract, or fails to show that 
certain conditions were present that made the marriage unworkable, she may lose the right to her 
deferred marriage portion. These conditions are again subject to local variation; however, 
generally speaking, if a husband abused his wife, prevented her from seeing her family, or failed 
to provide her with enough to eat, for example, the marriage would likely be considered 
unworkable and the wife would be owed her deferred marriage portion even if she had initiated 
divorce. Finally, it should be noted that both classical Islamic jurisprudence and shariat angrezi 
entitles the woman to keep any property that she brought with her into the marriage, be it 
financial or physical, and to keep the initial marriage portion no matter the circumstances 
surrounding the divorce. 
Family law in Britain, on the other hand, operates under an entirely different set of 
assumptions.2 The state first started taxing marriages in 1690 and soon found that large numbers 
of parishioners (nearly half, in one case) had married under the blessing of a traveling clergyman 
or in some other private setting rather than under the supervision of the Church of England 
(Walker 2009, para. 8). This complicated the collection of taxes as well as the ability of the 
government, state, or community to establish whether or not a given marriage was valid. In fact, 
well into the eighteenth century, thousands of couples had no idea if they were legally married, 
and this widespread occurrence of clandestine marriages enabled abuses that ranged from the 
                                                
2 Family law is subject to some variation in Scotland, Ireland, and England and Wales; for the purposes of this 
paper, we will focus on English Family Law as it is applied in England and Wales. 
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forced kidnapping, drugging, raping, or marrying of wealthy heiresses to incestuous, bigamous, 
or under-aged marriages (Walker 2009, para. 12, 13). The fact that so many marriages had taken 
place with no witnesses and no paperwork made it relatively easy for many of these practices to 
continue (Walker 2009, para. 13). In an attempt to end the proliferation of such abuses, the 1753 
Marriage Act was passed, which essentially gave the Church of England a “monopoly” on the 
legitimization of marriage ceremonies (Beresford 2011, 3-4) and declared that all marriage 
ceremonies had to be conducted by a minister in a parish church or chapel of the Church of 
England in order to be legally binding (UK Parliament 2012, under “Irregular marriages”). The 
presence of witnesses as well as their participation in various social rituals marking the occasion 
of a marriage also significantly decreased the likelihood that any future questions of its validity 
would arise. In the nineteenth century, the House of Commons recommended the establishment 
of a national—rather than ecclesiastical—registry of birth, marriages, and deaths to be carried 
out by civil, rather than church, officials; these recommendations became enshrined in the 
Registration Act of 1836 and the Marriage Act of 1836 (Beresford 2011, 4). 
These and other laws, though centuries old, have continued to place burdens on British 
Muslims. The Places of Worship Registration Act of 1855, for example, allows a legal marriage 
to take place in venues other than the Church of England so long as the ceremony is held in a 
separate building used only for worship; however, as most English mosques double as 
community or cultural centers, only 74 out of 452 mosques were suitable for a legal marriage to 
take place as recently as 1991 (Yimaz 2002, 347). The Marriage Act of 1949 allows the Church 
of England and the Church of Wales to conduct marriage ceremonies that enjoy both religious 
and legal standing; other denominations, however, must obtain a registrar’s certificate or license, 
as religious officials belonging to any organization other than the Churches of Wales or England 
are not authorized by the state to issue certificates or licenses. Mosques have therefore had to 
invite a state official to act on behalf of the registrar, or alternatively, seek out permission to have 
an imam act as such. These impositions, as well as the restrictions placed on the physical 
building in which a valid marriage can take place, have meant that most Muslims are compelled 
to undergo two different ceremonies in order to contract a legal marriage: one civil ceremony 
taking place under the authority of English law, and one Muslim nikah ceremony. Muslims who 
have failed to conform to any aspect of Marriage Act of 1949 will find that they do not have a 
legal marriage, and they will be treated as a cohabiting couple under civil law. The act of getting 
(legally) married is thus shaped by Christian assumptions and values to the point of burdening 
non-Christians; so too are notions of marriage, and family law itself.  
As aforementioned, contemporary British Muslim marriage practices are informed by a 
long history of classical Islamic jurisprudence wherein a marriage was simply regarded as a 
certain kind of contract that legitimated sexual relationships under certain conditions and 
between certain people. To be sure, it should be stressed once again that the character of Muslim 
marriage has changed significantly in the post-colonial period and in diaspora; however, it has 
retained inter alia the notion that divorce, while undesirable, is not a sin, as well as the idea that 
women should use their marriage contracts to protect themselves from destitution in the event of 
a divorce.  
The character of marriage in England and Wales, on the other hand, is still informed by 
the view that the couple is expected to bond for life. As Lord Justice Thorpe, one of the judges of 
the Court of Appeal at England and Wales, wrote in N v N (Jurisdiction: Pre-nuptial Agreement) 
(1999) 2 F.L.R 745, which has been cited in numerous cases where a prenuptial agreement is in 
play: 
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The attitude of the English Courts to antenuptial agreements […] has always been 
that they are not enforceable. The difference between an antenuptial settlement 
and an antenuptial contract or agreement is that the former seeks to regulate the 
financial affairs of the spouse on and during their marriage. It does not 
contemplate the dissolution of the marriage. By contrast, an agreement made prior 
to marriage which contemplates the steps the parties will take in the event of 
divorce or separation is perceived as being contrary to public policy as it 
undermines the concept of marriage as a life-long union [emphases mine].3 
 
Although the normative conception of marriage as a lifelong union is certainly changing, 
this value still explicitly informs English and Welsh family law, and divorce is still formally 
considered to be against public interest. Therefore, as established by the Matrimonial Causes Act 
of 1973, the British court has not under any circumstances been obligated to uphold the 
prenuptial (also called antenuptial) agreement, even if the terms and conditions of the agreement 
are in keeping with English and Welsh law, or if the agreement was considered a legal and 
binding contract in the country where it was made. This does not mean, however, that courts 
have completely ignored the cultural context of a marriage or the religious values of the 
respondents, as Dame Florence Jacqueline Baron wrote in her decision in A v T (Ancillary 
Relief: Cultural Factors) (2004) 1 F.L.R. 977: 
 
When carrying out the exercise under s 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in 
a case involving a family with only a secondary attachment to the English 
jurisdiction and culture, an English judge should give due weight to the primary 
cultural factors, and not ignore the differential between what the wife might 
anticipate from a determination in England as opposed to a determination in the 
alternative jurisdiction, including that as one of “the circumstances of the case.” 
[….] It is my view that this rationale applies to an application for full ancillary 
relief [alimony, or maintenance]. 
 
 It should be noted that there are no official guidelines as to what kinds of couples have a 
“secondary attachment” to the English jurisdiction; however, couples who wish to settle assets 
using the Muslim marriage contract as a guide are, by definition, possessive of a “secondary 
attachment” to English jurisdiction, given that the Muslim marriage contract is based on Shar’ia 
law, rather than English law. In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that English courts were ready to 
attribute “appropriate” weight to a prenuptial agreement, and that this weight could be 
“decisive… in the right case,” but they added that courts would still be able to waive them at 
their discretion (“Supreme Court Rules in Favour of Pre-nuptial Agreements” 2010, para. 2). In 
practice, therefore, the Muslim marriage contract is not dispositive, but is rather regarded as a 
                                                
3 As established by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, British courts are not bound by a prenuptial agreement 
even if it is considered a legal and binding contract in the country where it was made. However, it can be given 
“evidential weight” when a family has a “secondary attachment” to English jurisdiction and culture. There is no 
official policy on how to determine whether or not a family has a “secondary attachment” to English jurisdiction and 
culture; this is generally left to the discretion of the presiding judge. However, generally speaking, Muslims are 
often presumed to have this secondary attachment even if they have lived in the U.K. for years, or even decades. 
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suggestion; the court may or may not uphold it, depending on the inclinations of the presiding 
judge. 
For Muslim women, this has profound consequences, particularly since English family 
law is not as fair to women as one might expect. A 2009 study by the Institute for Social and 
Economic Research concluded that the incomes of ex-husbands rose by 25% immediately after a 
divorce, but women saw a sharp fall in their finances, which rarely regained pre-divorce levels 
(Gray 2009, para. 2). About 27% of divorced women ended up living in poverty after splitting 
with their husbands, which is about three times the number of ex-husbands who were relegated 
to poverty (Gray 2009, para. 3). Finally, slightly less than one third of divorced women with 
children receive child support from their ex-husbands (Gray 2009, para. 3).  
Muslim women have therefore learned to strategize very carefully: if the couple has a 
marriage recognized both under English law and under the Shar’ia, the husband can choose to 
file a civil divorce and refuse to give the talaq, thus freeing him not only from his legal marriage 
and the burdens associated therewith, but also from the obligation of paying the deferred 
marriage portion as he will not be divorced according to the Shar’ia. This practice, in fact, had 
become fairly widespread by 2008, when the Shar’ia councils became legally binding. As an 
example of the cases the Muslim Women’s Helpline addresses, a 2001 report quoted the 
testimony of an anonymous caller, “Siti” (lady in Arabic):  
 
Please, please can you help me? I am so despairing, I feel like ending it all. I am 
divorced from my husband but he tortures me by not divorcing me religiously 
[…] I contacted [the] Mosque and they said, “their only job is to make marriages, 
not to break them.” They don’t understand that my husband has left me and the 
kids for seven years now and he has a new life. I am struggling with no chance of 
re-marriage... (quoted in Césari, Caeiro, and Hussain 2004, 38) 
 
Women who are married in the eyes of the Shar’ia but not according to the state, on the 
other hand, are not exposed to the possibility of ending up in a “limping marriage” like the caller 
above, wherein they remain legally divorced, but married within the eyes of their community, 
under Shar’ia law and without their deferred marriage portions. In this case, there is but one way 
for a man to initiate divorce under the Shar’ia: this is through the triple talaq, thus triggering his 
obligation to pay his wife the deferred marriage portion, and ending the marriage in the eyes of 
God and the Muslim community.  
There is significant disincentive for Muslim British men to utter the talaq, however, 
given that the Muslim marriage contract can entitle a woman to far more than she would receive 
under English family law. The fact that women who seek the court’s help are, as aforementioned, 
at the mercy of the presiding judge has meant that the outcome is often unpredictable. The 
following two examples illustrate the reasons behind Muslims’ perceived capriciousness of the 
English legal system, and show further why Muslim women have chosen only to marry using 
Shar’ia councils and skip the formality of registering their marriages with the state, before the 
advent of legally binding Shar’ia law. 
 
Theory Into Practice: The Courts And Shar’ia Law 
 
In the 2000 case Ali vs. Ali, the couple, both professional working people, were both 
legally married and married under Shar’ia law. Mrs. Ali and her family had driven a hard 
8
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bargain and the deferred marriage portion, or deferred mahr, as stipulated by the marriage 
contract, was to be £30,001 (Menski 2002, 47). Mr. Ali attempted to file for divorce with the 
state a few months after marrying Mrs. Ali, and declined to issue a Shar’ia-compliant divorce, or 
talaq, thus avoiding any obligation to pay the deferred marriage portion under Islamic law 
(Menski 2002, 48). Mrs. Ali was therefore put in the position of being in a “limping marriage”: 
legally divorced, but still married under the Shar’ia, and furthermore, unable to collect on her 
deferred marriage portion because her husband had not uttered the talaq.4 
Mr. Ali’s wife therefore cross-petitioned the court to refuse her husband’s request for 
divorce until he paid her the deferred marriage portion. Mr. Ali himself, however, argued that 
because he had not issued the talaq, he was not initiating divorce proceedings in the religious 
sense—merely in the civil sense—and did not owe it to her. He argued further that Muslims 
never actually intend to pay the deferred mahr, but agree to high sums in order to maintain one’s 
social status, or izzat. Finally, he pointed out that under English law that she would not have been 
entitled to any financial relief, much less £30,001, given that she was a professional woman who 
had been married for only a few months and did not have any children (Menski 2002, 48). Under 
Shar’ia law, however, she was entitled to ancillary relief in the form of the deferred marriage 
portion. The expert witness disagreed strongly with Mr. Ali’s characterization of the deferred 
mahr as well as his description of izzat. In the end, the judge ordered Mr. Ali to divorce Mrs. Ali 
under Shar’ia law by issuing a talaq and to pay out a sum of £30,000: this way, he would avoid 
enforcing Shar’ia law in his courtroom while still managing to uphold the trust of the Muslim 
community.  
Other women, however, are not so fortunate as Mrs. Ali. In the case of NA v 
MOT  (2004) E.W.H.C. 471 (Fam),5 an educated, 29-year-old woman left Iran at the age of 24 to 
move to England and marry a 40-year-old, well-off Iranian businessman who had lived in the 
U.K. since 1978. Before her marriage and subsequent move to England, she had owned a small 
business in Iran, held a degree in English translation from an Iranian university, and had strong 
social and family ties. Her husband, the court noted, was well aware of her education, her 
independence, and her business. After selling her business in Iran, moving to England, and 
spending seven weeks of cohabitation with her new husband, the wife felt that her husband’s 
unwillingness to allow her to pursue full-time studies or any employment, as well as his 
insistence on controlling various other aspects of her life, made the marriage ultimately 
unsustainable. Furthermore, his behavior violated various stipulations in the marriage contract.6 
                                                
4 It should be noted that my synopsis of this case is based entirely on Werner Menski’s own synopsis thereof; I am 
thus unable to parse the specific details behind the court’s reasoning using the court’s own words, nor the words of 
Mr. and Mrs. Ali themselves. Werner Menski is, however, an expert on Shar’ia law as practiced in England, and is 
as reliable a source for which one could possibly hope. 
5 See also NG v KR, (2008) E.W.H.C. 1532 (Fam), (2009) 1 F.L.R. 1478, (2009) 1 F.C.R. 35, (2008) Fam Law 
1082 (Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL July 28, 2008). 
6 Unfortunately, the marriage contract is not included in the public record, and the court declined to transcribe or 
even describe it during proceedings. It is therefore difficult to assess claims that his treatment of her violated specific 
and clear conditions outlined in the marriage contract. It is possible, however, that his behavior could have 
nonetheless been considered abusive according to some contemporary schools of Shar’ia law. In cases of abuse, 
women are able to petition the court for a divorce and should the court find her claims compelling, allow her to keep 
the deferred marriage portion. Different courts and different schools of law disagree, however, on whether or not 
emotional or verbal abuse rises to the threshold of abuse, and some explicitly require that the abuse be physical in 
nature. 
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They separated, but the husband did not grant her the talaq and refused to pay her the 
deferred marriage portion to which she was entitled. Divorce proceedings in civil court were 
postponed for five years as the wife was forced to apply for state-funded representation to obtain 
her legal divorce in England. In its decision, the court noted that the husband had not really been 
affected by the marriage in terms of his ability to continue his life and could afford to pay the full 
sum of £60,000 that she was owed. The wife, on the other hand, would be forced to make a fresh 
start either in England or in Iran at the age of 29, had spent five years in a “limping marriage,” 
and was now in debt £37,000 because she had moved to England to join her husband. In the 
court’s estimation, the husband had simply thought he was marrying a “traditional Iranian wife” 
and found, sadly, that this was not the case when his wife arrived from Iran. In the end, the court 
ordered the husband only pay half the marriage portion to which the wife was entitled, which did 
not even cover her expenses from moving to England and the court costs she had incurred in the 
process of divorcing [NA v MOT  (2004) E.W.H.C. 471 (Fam)].  
 
Concluding Notes and Observations 
 
These two cases—Ali v Ali and NA v MOT—demonstrate first that some British Muslim 
women may, in fact, be better off under Shar’ia law than English and Welsh family law in the 
event of a divorce, disrupting conventionally held assumptions about the relative fairness of the 
two systems insofar as women’s rights are concerned. Second, these cases and others like them 
suggest that the continued use of the Shar’ia councils may be rooted in pragmatic considerations 
about property and autonomy rather than in a stubborn refusal to culturally assimilate.  
It should again be stressed that the Shar’ia councils cannot issue civil divorces; they can, 
however, request that the court mandate the husband talaq his wife as part of the divorce 
settlement, as was the case in both of the examples provided above. Such a service spares women 
the possibility of a “limping marriage,” and allows both parties to achieve closure once a civil 
divorce is filed. Those arguing that the Shar’ia councils will subject women to unfair treatment 
should therefore reevaluate this claim in light of the fact that the councils must operate within the 
framework of state law and regard the decision of the High Court as final. In allowing the 
introduction of legally binding Shar’ia, the state has not only managed to meet the needs of 
British Muslims, but also to retain its coercive authority over all systems for regulating behavior.  
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